

6 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI
Executive Director

SUBJECT: NPIC

1. While it is clear every effort should be made to improve NPIC in its present manifestation, such as the use of automatic processes and the hiring of more people, I have come to the conclusion that NPIC can no longer be subordinated solely to the Central Intelligence Agency - let alone one of the Agency components.

2. NSCID No. 8 clearly establishes NPIC as a national asset and one which in time of war will be run by the Pentagon.

3. It is not possible to get an objective judgment from CIA or any component of CIA on what size and shape NPIC should be. For example, so long as NPIC remains in the custody of the DDI, the wishes and desires of DDI analysts will tend to dominate NPIC's efforts.

4. Moreover, if NPIC is a national asset, (even as ^{it} ~~to~~ counterpart the National Reconnaissance Program) there will be a feeling, particularly on the part of the military services, that CIA's requirements and needs are given priority over those of the Pentagon. A case in point is the running dispute between DDI and COMOR. The latter body must accommodate the views of CIA and the other parts of the intelligence community.

5. However the jurisdictional question is settled, I believe there has been a fundamental failure on the part of all concerned to identify essential requirements. This failure in some measure or another underlies the uncontrolled growth of NSA, the bickering between NRO and COMOR, and indeed almost every facet of the inter-relationships of the intelligence community. Specifically, requirements are stated in terms of idealistic objectives with little regard for the real limitations on the collection mechanism - be they mechanical or human. A case in point

is the massive current intelligence requirements' Checklist which was waived recently at a Morning Meeting. No one can possibly take it seriously.

6. One mechanism did function with a close exchange between those analysts who wanted to know something and those operators who had the means to acquire the knowledge. I am referring to the predecessor of COMOR -- ARC (Ad Hoc Requirements).

7. I believe this analogy can be applied to our present dilemma over NPIC. Unless the decision is made to let our broad requirements stand, and to let all the geniuses in the world devise new sensors, new payloads, and new boosters - then we must decide here and now that there will be just so many people and so much money, and ask the users politely to list their priorities, and that will be that.

8. Some expansion has already been dictated by developments in collection which are proceeding or just beginning to appear on the horizon. I believe that the other components of the community should have a larger say in the conduct of reconnaissance missions and the exploitation of the product. For example, there is a range of satellite requirements extending from the idealistic objective of an early-warning bird to the other ^{ASMA} extent of an annual mapping mission. The Joint Chiefs are legitimately concerned that efforts continue for early warning. The Army Map Service has a responsibility to see that its mission is carried out. In between there are a broad range of strategic requirements which are largely the responsibility of CIA, or more appropriately of the Board of National Estimates.

9. In short, a community effort requires community participation, and it can be done as narrowly or as broadly as we wish.


10. If there are no limitations on money and manpower, then I know of only one department in our government qualified to manage NPIC. It is the Department of Defense. NPIC, under Pentagon management, would still be responsive to USIB requirements. USIB cannot manage anything - and I regret to say that our experience with NPIC in allowing it to get to the state that it is, suggests that ^{no} ~~any~~ component or over-all unit in this Agency cannot manage it. The DCI cannot manage it. He can appoint a monitor, but he does not have the resources at his command.

11. (The NRO, under Pentagon management, is responsive to USIB requirements. One of the major sources of friction in the NRO has been CIA's efforts to dominate requirements quite apart from their efforts to compete with the Air Force in an operating role.) Even if the logic of the foregoing is accepted - what, you may ask, do I suggest we do about it as a practical matter?

12. I suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence empower the Executive Director to outline for DCI approval, with the advice of the United States Intelligence Board, the following proposals:

- a. A modestly expanded NPIC with rigidly defined priorities for exploitation.
- b. An uninhibited NPIC with unlimited resources designed to stay abreast of all possible developments in collection.
- c. An independent NPIC staffed by the community, managed by the Department of Defense, and responsive to better defined USIB requirements.

13. It may be the DDI has a better answer. If so, the foregoing proposal might stimulate their response.



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